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Five Per Cent Comes Back, Nineteen Years Later

The benchmark United States 10-year Treasury yield has returned to a level last seen in 2007, and the Federal Reserve is now expected to raise rates rather than cut them. The Government of Jamaica priced a US$1 billion bond days before the move. This edition sets out what a five per cent world does to Caribbean governments, businesses and households – and why most of the region has no monetary defence against it.

Exhibit S0: At a Glance.

Master Chart: Benchmark government bond yields at multi-decade highs.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS EDITION

TERMMEANING
BOJBank of Jamaica, the central bank of Jamaica
ECCUEastern Caribbean Currency Union, the eight-member monetary union served by the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank
CCRIFThe Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility, which provides parametric disaster insurance to member governments
CRDCClimate-resilient debt clause, a contractual provision allowing a borrower to defer payments after a qualifying disaster
GDPGross domestic product
WTIWest Texas Intermediate, the main United States crude oil benchmark
Basis pointOne hundredth of one percentage point. One hundred basis points equal 1.00%

SECTION ONE

The Week the World Repriced

On Tuesday 15 September 2026 the benchmark United States 10-year Treasury yield climbed to its highest level since 2007 as a sell-off in United States government debt deepened ahead of the Federal Reserve’s interest-rate decision. The 10-year yield jumped more than six basis points to 5.025%. The 30-year Treasury bond, more sensitive to long-run inflation and geopolitical risk, rose above 5.38%. The 2-year note, which tracks expectations for short-term policy most closely, reached about 4.68%.

The day before, the 10-year had touched 5.014% intraday before easing back to settle near 4.99%. The 5% level has functioned for two decades as a psychological boundary rather than an arithmetic one. Crossing it does not change any contract. What it changes is the assumption underneath every contract yet to be written.

A single sentence explains why this edition exists. Markets are pricing roughly an 89% probability that the Federal Reserve raises its policy rate by a quarter of a percentage point this week. That would be the first increase in United States borrowing costs since 2023. For four years the debate in every treasury department in this region has been about when rates would come down and by how much. That debate is over for now. The question has become how high they go and how long they stay.

Crossing five per cent does not change any contract. What it changes is the assumption underneath every contract yet to be written.

This is not a United States story with regional consequences. It is a global repricing. Japan’s 10-year government bond yield has moved above 3% for the first time in about thirty years, in a country that spent three decades fighting deflation. The United Kingdom sold a 30-year gilt at 5.8168%, its highest borrowing yield at an auction or syndication since comparable records began in 1998, and 30-year gilt yields have reached their highest since May 1998. German and French long-dated yields have reached their highest levels since 2011 and 2008 respectively. A Bloomberg gauge of global government bond yields rose to 3.72%, the highest since mid-2008.

When every major sovereign borrower reprices in the same direction at the same time, the cause is not any one central bank. It is a change in what the world believes money should cost.

Exhibit E01: The path of the United States 10-year Treasury yield to 15 September 2026.

SECTION TWO

What Actually Moved It

Three forces are pushing in the same direction, and they compound rather than simply add.

The first is energy. Brent crude rose toward US$108 a barrel, a four-month high, after Saudi Arabia shut a major crude pipeline following drone attacks – a route used to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi output has recently fallen to its lowest since 1990. The transmission from oil into yields is unusually direct at present: the one-month rolling correlation between front-month West Texas Intermediate crude and the 10-year Treasury yield has climbed to 0.96, according to BMO Capital Markets. In plain terms, the bond market is currently trading as though it were an oil derivative, because higher energy prices feed straight into inflation expectations.

The second is supply. Total United States national debt passed US$40 trillion by August 2026, and the annual interest bill on that stock grows with every refinancing cycle. At the same time demand has softened: net foreign private demand for United States Treasuries fell to US$16.6 billion in June 2026. More paper, fewer willing buyers, and the price of that paper falls – which is the same thing as saying the yield rises. The United States Treasury has responded by announcing it will double its long-bond buyback operations to at least US$4 billion per operation.

The third force did not exist in any meaningful size two years ago. Allianz Research estimated that borrowers connected to artificial intelligence raised US$356 billion in United States credit markets during 2026 to the end of August, compared with US$174 billion in the whole of 2025. Crucially, the large technology platform companies had issued about US$150 billion of dollar bonds during 2026 while only about US$23 billion of their debt was due to mature before the end of 2027. That distinction matters enormously: this is new money being raised, not old debt being rolled. Investors have to find fresh capital to absorb it, and that capital has to be bid away from somewhere.

Allianz also found that spreads widened considerably more for the artificial-intelligence borrower group than for the wider investment-grade market, which suggests those companies have so far paid much of the additional cost themselves. Artificial-intelligence issuance is therefore an accelerant rather than the cause. Oil, inflation expectations and government borrowing remain the engine.

Exhibit E02: The three forces behind the global repricing.

SECTION THREE

Jamaica’s Window: Fourteen Days in September

On 2 September 2026 the Government of Jamaica returned to the international capital markets with a US$1 billion unsecured bond – its first cross-border issue in nearly three years – and simultaneously invited holders of three existing global bonds to sell them back. The target securities were the 6.75% notes due 2028, the 8.5% notes due 2036 and the 8.0% notes due 2039, with outstanding principal of about US$2.33 billion.

Investor meetings began on 3 September. Citigroup Global Markets and Scotia Capital served as dealer managers and joint lead underwriters. Approximately US$600 million of the proceeds was intended to finance the tender and exchange offer, with the remaining US$400 million available for general budgetary purposes. The new bond was expected to list on the Euro MTF market of the Luxembourg Stock Exchange.

THE TRANSACTION AT A GLANCE

ELEMENTTERM
Issue sizeUS$1 billion, unsecured
Launch date2 September 2026
CouponApproximately 6.25%, below initial guidance of around 6.50%
StructureAmortising in three roughly equal instalments rather than a single bullet repayment
Use of proceedsAbout US$600m to fund the tender and exchange; about US$400m for general budgetary purposes
Bonds targeted6.75% 2028, 8.5% 2036 and 8.0% 2039, with about US$2.33bn outstanding
Tendered by closeAbout US$476.62m, roughly 17% of targeted volume, of which about US$343m in the 2028s
SettlementExpected by 17 September 2026 for both legs

Source: Caribbean360, The Caribbean Council and Rio Times Online, September 2026, citing offering documents filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.

The transaction did what liability management is supposed to do. It was oversubscribed. It priced below guidance. It replaced expensive old paper – the 2036 notes carried a coupon of 8.5% – with cheaper new paper at about 6.25%. And it spread repayment across three instalments rather than concentrating it on a single date.

Now place that against the calendar. On 8 September the United States 10-year Treasury yield stood at 4.80%. The tender closed on 9 September. By 15 September the same benchmark was above 5.02%. Settlement for both legs of Jamaica’s transaction is expected on 17 September – the day after the Federal Reserve announces its decision.

Jamaica did not time the market. Jamaica happened to be standing in a window that stayed open for roughly ten days and has since closed.

At a coupon of about 6.25% against a benchmark of roughly 4.85% around the pricing date, Jamaica borrowed at a spread in the order of 140 basis points over the United States 10-year. That spread figure is derived by BATV rather than reported, because no benchmark level was published for the pricing date itself. But the direction is not in doubt. An issuer coming to market today at the same credit spread would pay meaningfully more, because the base rate beneath the spread has moved.

One qualification deserves emphasis, and it is not flattering. Only about 17% of the targeted volume was actually tendered, and most of what came in was the shorter-dated 2028 paper. Holders of the 8.5% 2036s and 8.0% 2039s largely declined to sell. That is a rational decision by those investors: in a world repricing toward five per cent, an 8.5% coupon from a sovereign with a strong tourism season behind it is a good asset to hold. The buyback therefore retired far less expensive debt than it set out to retire.

Exhibit E03: The Jamaica transaction timeline against the United States 10-year Treasury yield.

SECTION FOUR

Who Can Absorb This, and Who Cannot

This is the section that matters most for the region, and it is the one least often made explicit.

A fixed exchange rate is a decision to import another country’s monetary policy. The Bahamas maintains parity at B$1 to US$1. Barbados holds BDS$2 to US$1. Belize holds BZ$2 to US$1. The eight members of the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union share a rate of EC$2.70 to US$1. These parities have held for decades and are, correctly, sources of national pride and commercial stability.

The price of that stability is monetary autonomy. When the Federal Reserve raises rates, a pegged economy must allow its own domestic rates to follow or watch capital leave and reserves drain. There is no third option that lasts. A Bahamian or Barbadian or Vincentian business will therefore face a higher cost of money over the coming year not because of anything happening in Nassau, Bridgetown or Kingstown, but because of what is happening in Washington – and no domestic authority can vote against it.

Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana manage their rates against the United States dollar and therefore have somewhat more latitude, but the first call on that latitude is defending the exchange rate itself.

Jamaica is the regional exception. Its floating exchange rate gives the Bank of Jamaica a genuine choice. The difficulty is that the choice is already spoken for. Headline inflation at July 2026 was 7.5%, up from 6.7% at June and 3.3% a year earlier, and above the upper limit of the Bank’s 4.0 to 6.0% target range for a second consecutive month – the first such run since September 2024. Core inflation, which excludes agricultural food products and fuel, was 5.2%. The Bank has held its policy rate at 5.50% and projects a continued breach of the target range over the September 2026 quarter.

So Jamaica holds the only meaningful monetary lever in the English-speaking Caribbean, and is already using it to fight an energy-driven inflation problem. Independence of policy is not the same thing as freedom of action.

Exhibit E04: Exchange rate arrangements and the resulting room to set domestic interest rates.

SECTION FIVE

What It Costs a Government

The arithmetic of sovereign borrowing is unforgiving and easy to state. Every one hundred basis points on a US$1 billion borrowing costs ten million United States dollars a year. Over an eleven-year instrument, that single percentage point is one hundred and ten million dollars – money that buys no road, staffs no clinic and teaches no child.

Jamaica’s new paper at about 6.25% costs roughly US$62.5 million a year in interest. The 8.5% notes it was designed to retire cost about US$85 million on the same principal. That gap of 225 basis points is the entire commercial case for liability management, and it is why the exercise was worth doing even though take-up was thin.

Regional comparators show how quickly these prices age. Trinidad and Tobago refinanced a US$1 billion bond in January 2026 at 6.50% for ten years, and subsequently issued a US$800 million twelve-year bond carrying a 6.20% coupon. Those were competitive prices when struck. They are now historic prices rather than current ones.

REGIONAL SOVEREIGN PRICING, 2026 ISSUES

ISSUERSIZETENORCOUPON
Trinidad and TobagoUS$1.0bn10 years6.50%
Trinidad and TobagoUS$800m12 years6.20%
JamaicaUS$1.0bnAmortising, reported as possibly 2037Approximately 6.25%

Source: The Caribbean Council and Caribbean360, September 2026. Jamaica maturity reported as possibly 2037; final terms were not disclosed at the time of the reports cited.

The uncomfortable inference is straightforward. Every Caribbean sovereign with a refinancing need in the next twenty-four months is now looking at a materially higher clearing price than the ones in this table, unless spreads compress enough to offset the move in the base rate. Nothing in the current picture suggests they will.

Exhibit E05: The cost of a US$1 billion borrowing at different coupons.

SECTION SIX

The Entrepreneur’s Stack, Rebuilt

Part 04 of this series set out the cost-of-money stack as a Caribbean business actually experiences it: five and a half per cent at the central bank, twelve and a half per cent at the counter. The gap between those two numbers is bank margin, operating cost, capital requirement and credit risk. That gap is not a scandal. It is the price of intermediation.

What has changed is not the gap. It is the floor underneath it.

For any borrowing denominated in United States dollars – which is most equipment finance, most trade finance, most hotel construction and most cross-border working capital in this region – the stack begins with the global risk-free rate. That rate is 0.94 percentage points higher than it was a year ago and 0.26 points higher than a month ago. A Caribbean corporate borrower who pays the sovereign spread plus a credit spread on top of a 5.025% base is now looking at a headline cost of money in the region of eight per cent or more, on a facility that would have cleared closer to seven a year ago.

The Bank of Jamaica rate has not moved. The base underneath the entire United States dollar stack has moved almost a full percentage point in a year.

For an entrepreneur, three practical consequences follow, and none of them requires a forecast to be true.

  • Hurdle rates have risen. A project appraised at a 7% cost of capital in 2025 must now clear a higher bar. Some projects that were marginal are now negative, and the honest response is to stop them rather than re-argue the assumptions until they pass.
  • Floating-rate exposure has become the dominant balance-sheet risk. Businesses carrying variable-rate debt or short revolving facilities reprice fastest. Smaller companies tend to hold proportionally more floating-rate debt than larger peers, so their interest expense climbs more quickly as rates rise.
  • Covenant headroom is eroding quietly. Interest cover ratios are calculated on interest actually paid. A covenant that was comfortable at last year’s rate can breach at this year’s rate without a single sale being lost.

The most leveraged borrowers, and those accustomed to a long era of cheap money, are the pressure points. That is a statement about balance sheet structure, not about business quality.

Exhibit E06: The cost-of-money stack rebuilt at a five per cent base.

SECTION SEVEN

The Household Bill

Citizens do not read yield curves. They read electricity bills, taxi fares, mortgage statements and the price of a basket at the supermarket. The bond market reaches them through all four.

In Jamaica, headline inflation at July 2026 was 7.5%, above the 6.7% recorded at June and far above the 3.3% of July 2025. The Bank of Jamaica attributed the July increase mainly to the second phase of increases in route taxi and hackney carriage fares and to the pass-through of higher international commodity prices into electricity rates and selected services. Core inflation reached 5.2%.

That is the energy channel, and it arrives first. The interest-rate channel arrives second and lasts longer. The 10-year Treasury yield is the benchmark for borrowing costs across the wider economy, and mortgage rates track it closely. In the United States, the average price of a gallon of petrol reached US$4.15. In a pegged Caribbean economy, the same repricing flows through to mortgage and consumer credit rates with very little to slow it down.

For a household, the practical exposure is concentrated in a small number of places: any mortgage approaching the end of a fixed period, any variable-rate consumer or credit card balance, any hire-purchase or motor vehicle financing arranged in the cheap-money years, and any small business facility supporting family income. These are the items worth checking now rather than at renewal.

There is a second-order effect that deserves naming. When debt servicing absorbs a larger share of government revenue, the capacity to subsidise, to rebuild after storms and to expand social provision shrinks. The citizen pays twice: once at the counter and once through the narrowing of what the state can afford to do.

Exhibit E07: Jamaica inflation against the Bank of Jamaica target range.

SECTION EIGHT

The Wall Behind the Window

The region enters this repricing from a position that climate has already weakened. Six Caribbean countries now exceed 80% of gross domestic product in public debt, and debt servicing consumes close to 40% of budget revenues. Research cited this year indicates that severe hurricanes raise Caribbean sovereign debt by around 10%, with debt levels three years after a storm sitting some 18% above the pre-storm trend.

Jamaica knows this arithmetic directly. Hurricane Melissa struck on 28 October 2025, and infrastructure damage was subsequently estimated at more than 40% of gross domestic product. Tourism has since delivered a genuine recovery – 2.34 million visitors and US$2.5 billion in earnings in the eight months to 31 August 2026 – but the sector continues to operate with reduced hotel capacity, and the latest borrowing comes amid weaker-than-budgeted fiscal performance in the opening months of the 2026/27 year.

The structural risk is a timing problem rather than a solvency problem. Around 20% of United States dollar-denominated debt issued by emerging market and developing economies matures by 2027, with high-risk borrowers facing a slightly higher share. For non-investment-grade countries, secondary market yields on maturing debt often exceed 10%. Countries refinancing into that market will face a significant rise in borrowing costs that then persists for the whole life of the new bonds.

A maturity that falls in a good year is refinanced. A maturity that falls in a bad year is a crisis. Nothing about the instrument changes; only the calendar does.

There are genuine regional defences, and they are not rhetorical. Climate-resilient debt clauses allow a borrower to pause payments after a qualifying disaster. Barbados has led their implementation through its sovereign bond restructurings and multilateral lending, and Prime Minister Mia Mottley told an Inter-American Development Bank event in May 2026 that these clauses would allow Barbados to free the equivalent of 17 to 18% of its gross domestic product over two years if disaster strikes. Parametric payouts through the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility reduce first-year debt accumulation, although premium costs are squeezing budgets. Commonwealth officials drafting a July 2026 partnership document explicitly encouraged scaling up climate-resilient provisions, with standardising the triggers a key outstanding recommendation.

These instruments share a common virtue: they operate outside the commercial bond market and therefore outside the repricing described in this edition. In a five per cent world, that is precisely their value.

Exhibit E08: The structural debt position behind the current window.

SECTION NINE

The Case Against Alarm

This edition would be incomplete, and unfair, without the serious arguments on the other side. They are not weak ones.

The first is that this is normalisation rather than crisis. A 10-year Japanese government bond yield at 3% has been described by market strategists as a milestone in repricing for a higher inflation regime and a higher neutral rate, not as a breakdown. Three decades of near-zero rates were the anomaly; the current level is closer to the long historical norm.

The second is that the reason for a yield rise matters more than its size. Yields climbing because of strong economic growth carry very different implications for the economy than yields driven by resurgent inflation, mounting deficits or stress within the Treasury market itself. On this reading, higher yields accompanied by a resilient economy and steady core inflation are not automatically bearish.

The third is specific to Jamaica, and it is fair. The issue was oversubscribed, priced below guidance, and structured to amortise rather than mature in a single bullet. Tourism earnings are supplying real foreign exchange behind the credit. The exercise reduced refinancing risk even if it did not retire as much expensive paper as intended.

The fourth is that the region’s most important financing is not raised in this market at all. Multilateral concessional lending, parametric insurance and climate-resilient clauses sit outside commercial pricing entirely.

And the fifth is that authorities are responding. The United States Treasury has announced it will double its long-bond buyback operations to at least US$4 billion per operation, a measure intended to support liquidity in a market showing signs of strain.

BATV’s assessment is that these arguments correctly caution against panic, and do not dispose of the planning problem. A board that concludes from them that no action is required has drawn the wrong inference from the right facts.

Exhibit E09: The principal arguments against alarm.

SECTION TEN

Eight Questions for the Board

Directors do not need to forecast the Federal Reserve. They need to know what their own balance sheet does if the forecast is wrong. These eight questions are designed to be asked at the next meeting and answered with figures rather than assurances.

  1. What proportion of our debt reprices within twenty-four months, and at what assumed rate?
  2. Have we modelled our covenants at a benchmark rate of 5.5% rather than 4%, and what breaks first?
  3. Which of our facilities are floating rather than fixed, and who at this table owns that exposure?
  4. If we operate in a pegged territory, what is our plan for the point at which domestic rates follow the Federal Reserve?
  5. Does our capital expenditure programme still clear its hurdle rate at today’s cost of money, on today’s numbers?
  6. What is our foreign-currency revenue cover against our foreign-currency debt service, stressed for a weaker exchange rate?
  7. When did we last genuinely test the appetite of our lenders, rather than assume it from the last renewal?
  8. If a financing window opens for ten days, are our approval processes fast enough to use it?

Exhibit E10: Eight questions for the board.

VERDICT

The Price of Money Is Set Elsewhere

The central claim of this series has been that the price of money is not decided in Kingston, Bridgetown, Port of Spain or Nassau. It is decided in the markets that set the global risk-free rate, and it arrives in the Caribbean as a bill. This month, that claim stopped being an argument and became an observation.

Jamaica used a window. The window has closed. The rest of the region must now plan on the assumption that it does not reopen at these prices – and if it does, that the interval will again be measured in days rather than quarters. That is a statement about institutional readiness as much as about markets. A government or a company that cannot move inside ten days cannot use a ten-day window.

Exhibit: Verdict scorecard.

Part 05 of THE PRICE OF MONEY, “The Maturity Wall: Why 2028 and 2039 Are Different Problems”, follows.

STANDING NOTICE

Right of Response

BATV series are built on public information and expert analysis. BATV does not delay publication to obtain responses from the institutions examined, and does not send outreach letters before or after publication. Any government, central bank, issuer, exchange or institution referred to in this edition is free to read what has been published and to challenge any point or conclusion. Where a stakeholder does so, BATV will publish a feature response article carrying their clarification in full.

Correspondence should be addressed to info@batvja.com.

SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY

Reported Figures and BATV-Derived Figures

REPORTED FIGURES. The following are taken directly from the sources named and are not BATV calculations:

  • United States Treasury yields of 5.025% (10-year), 5.384% (30-year) and approximately 4.68% (2-year), and the market-implied probability of a rate increase: CNBC and TradingView, 14-15 September 2026.
  • The 10-year level of 4.80% at 8 September 2026, the intraday high of 5.014% and settlement near 4.99% on 14 September, and the changes of 0.94 points over one year and 0.26 points over one month: CNBC and Trading Economics.
  • Gilt, Japanese government bond, German, French and global gauge levels: Bloomberg, CNBC, Trading Economics and INDmoney, 1-15 September 2026.
  • Brent crude toward US$108, the Saudi pipeline closure and output at its lowest since 1990: Trading Economics, 13-14 September 2026. The 0.96 crude-to-yield correlation: BMO Capital Markets via CNBC.
  • United States national debt above US$40 trillion, net foreign private Treasury demand of US$16.6 billion in June 2026, and the doubling of long-bond buyback operations: Crypto Briefing summary of market data, September 2026.
  • Artificial-intelligence credit issuance of US$356 billion in 2026 to end-August against US$174 billion in 2025, and hyperscaler issuance of about US$150 billion against US$23 billion maturing before end-2027: Allianz Research via INDmoney.
  • All terms of the Jamaica issue and buyback, including the approximate 6.25% coupon, guidance of around 6.50%, the US$2.33 billion outstanding on the target bonds, the US$476.62 million tendered and the 17 September settlement: Caribbean360, The Caribbean Council and Rio Times Online, September 2026, citing filings with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.
  • Trinidad and Tobago pricing of 6.50% over ten years and 6.20% over twelve years: The Caribbean Council.
  • Jamaica inflation of 7.5% at July 2026, 6.7% at June 2026 and 3.3% at July 2025, core inflation of 5.2%, the 4.0 to 6.0% target range and the 5.50% policy rate: Bank of Jamaica monetary policy press releases, February, May and August 2026, reporting Statistical Institute of Jamaica data.
  • Tourism arrivals of 2.34 million and earnings of US$2.5 billion to August 2026, and Hurricane Melissa damage above 40% of gross domestic product: The Caribbean Council, Caribbean360 and Bank of Jamaica.
  • Caribbean debt indicators, hurricane debt effects and climate-resilient debt clause capacity, including the remarks of Prime Minister Mia Mottley in May 2026: Rio Times Online, September 2026. Emerging market maturity and yield data: OECD Global Debt Report.

BATV-DERIVED FIGURES. The following are BATV calculations or assessments and are identified as such wherever they appear:

  • The approximate 140 basis point spread of the Jamaica issue over the United States 10-year Treasury. No benchmark level was published for the pricing date; the spread is derived against an assumed base of approximately 4.85%, interpolated between the reported 8 September and 14 September levels.
  • The one-year and one-month points on Exhibit E01, derived by applying the reported 0.94 and 0.26 percentage point changes to the 14 September level of 4.99%.
  • The interest cost illustration in Exhibit E05, calculated on a US$1 billion principal held flat for eleven years, ignoring amortisation, fees and exchange-rate effects. The actual instrument amortises in three instalments. Coupons other than 6.25% and 8.5% are illustrative only.
  • The composition of the United States dollar cost-of-money stack in Exhibit E06, including the corporate spread component, and the 12.5% counter rate carried forward from Part 04 of this series. These illustrate a typical borrower rather than any quoted price.
  • The assessment of policy room by exchange rate arrangement in Exhibit E04, and all scoring in the Verdict exhibit.

Exchange rate parities are stated as long-standing official arrangements. Figures were current at the time of writing on 15 September 2026 and market levels move continuously.

ABOUT BUSINESS ACCESS TELEVISION (BATV)

Business Access Television (BATV) is a Caribbean business media platform delivering financial journalism, market analysis and corporate storytelling across the region. BATV is part of the Dawgen Media group and an affiliate of Dawgen Global, an independent integrated multidisciplinary professional services firm headquartered in Kingston, Jamaica. Editorial enquiries: editorial@batvja.com. Visit: www.batvja.com.

For feedback: contact the BATV Editorial Division at: info@batvja.com

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